1174
N. Y. 790 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
[1987] ). Were we to impose a general
duty of care requiring landowners to illu-
minate their property during all hours of
darkness, the financial and environmental
costs would surely outweigh any social
benefit. Moreover, finding a failure to
illuminate alone created a dangerous con-
dition would produce an indeterminate
class of plaintiffs without any reasonable
limitations on liability. The unexpected
guest or the vacationing homeowner might
soon be swept into the duty’s reach (see
e.g. Miccoli v. Kotz, 278 A.D.2d 460, 717
N.Y.S.2d 661 [2d Dept.2000] ).
As in Gallagher, we would be hard
pressed to conclude that a landowner with
knowledge of a condition easily alleviated
by illumination (such as a curb or a step) is
not required to light the area. But plain-
tiff seeks a general duty to illuminate the
lot. In her view, an unlit lot is per se
dangerous. She contends the dangerous
condition is the inadequate illumination of
the lot. In our view, the duty is not a
generalized one-size-fits-all duty, it is a
remedy employed by a landowner to avoid
injury to others that is measured by Bas-
so.
[4] At trial, defendants requested the
Basso charge set out in PJI 2:91. Plaintiff
countered that the charge should be modi-
fied to delete the instruction regarding
notice of a dangerous condition on the
ground that defendants had a duty to light
the lot and their reliance on the lighting on
the adjacent delicatessen ‘‘created’’ an in-
adequate lighting condition. While a de-
fendant’s creation of a dangerous condition
may relieve a plaintiff from having to
prove notice of that condition, here the
allegedly dangerous condition at most
arose from the adequacy of the existing
lighting not from installation of lights. To
hold otherwise would be to punish well-
intentioned landowners who take steps to
illuminate their property. Thus, reversal
is warranted in this case because, based on
this record, the jury should have been
asked to determine if defendants knew or
should have known that the existing light-
ing was adequate given the use and design
of the lot.
3
We have considered defendants’ remain-
ing contentions and find them without
merit. Accordingly, the order of the Ap-
pelSlate
146
Division should be reversed, with
costs, and a new trial ordered.
Chief Judge KAYE and Judges SMITH,
CIPARICK, ROSENBLATT, GRAFFEO
and READ concur.
Order reversed, etc.
,
100 N.Y.2d 147
S
147
40 WEST 67TH STREET,
Respondent,
v.
David PULLMAN, Appellant.
Court of Appeals of New York.
May 13, 2003.
Co-operative brought action seeking
to eject shareholder-tenant and recover
possession of his apartment based on his
‘‘objectional’’ conduct. The Supreme Court,
New York County, Marilyn Shafer, J., de-
3. Defendants did not contend at trial or on
appeal that plaintiff’s injuries were not fore-
seeable as a matter of law.